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A.

THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE DISPUTE THAT THE CHURCH \VAS THE
ONLY ENTITY AT THE CLEAN UP, THAT THE SMOCK THE CHURCH
FORCED MR. HENRIE TO \:YEAR \:Y AS GROTESQUELY LARGE, THAT
MR. HENRIE WAS ORDERED TO FULFILL THE CHURCH'S
ASSIGNMENT TO CLEAN UP, AS \YELL AS \VEAR THE SMOCK IN
ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEAN UP.

The Church tries to downplay its role in the clean up, characterizing it as the Church
"facilitated a 'service project."' 1 However, nowhere in the record, which was the Church's burden
on summary judgment, does the Church state that there were any other entities there conducting the
clean up. The Church never has disputed this.
Additionally, while the Church claims that Mr. Henrie was not ordered or required to
participate in the clean up, Mr. Henrie's testimony was that his bishop's request to him to go to the
clean up was an external order. R., p. 148 (Henrie Depa., p. 61, l. 7 top. 63, l. 15). This is
supported by Mr. Henrie's bishop's affidavit, stating that the stake president made a "request" of
Church members to go to the clean up as an "assignment." R., pp. 212-213 (Affidavit o_fFred Zundel,

,r,r 5-6).

The Church also does not dispute that the order it gave to Mr. Henrie complies with Church

doctrine, as councils in the Church are expected to elicit from their members efforts to meet
organizational needs. R., p. 203.
Additionally, the Church misrepresents the record by stating that the smock worn by Mr.

See Respondent's Brief, p. 1.

1
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handed to and worn by Mr. Henrie. R., p. 266-269. The only evidence in the record is Mr. Henrie's
testimony that it was "very grotesquely large." R., p. 154 (Henrie Depa., p. 88, ll. 13-20). Clearly,
it was an issue of fact as to \vhether it was reasonably foreseeable for the Church to know that
forcing Mr. Henrie to wear a "grotesquely large" smock, and the smock getting caught on the 2 foot
70 pound logs Mr. Henrie was throwing down a hill would lead to his injuries.
Also, there was a special relationship between the Church and Mr. Henrie. First, there is no
dispute that Mr. Henrie was the Elders Quorum President of his ward. Second, Mr. Henrie was also
"ordered" by his bishop to perform the assignment of the clean up. Third, the Church controlled
Mr. Henrie's actions, by ordering him to go to the clean up and wear the smock. The Church's agent
who handed out the smocks told Mr. Henrie that if he did not wear the grotesquely large smock,
which was all the Church had left, then he could not participate in the clean up. This fact is
corroborated by the video the Church/Mormon Helping Hands took. As this Court can see from the
video, at 48-52 seconds into the video, as well as at 1 :06-1 :13 minutes into the video, there are

sisters handing out smocks and telling people where to go. R., p. 129 (Gabiola A.ff, Exh. B). The
Video shows the tables and the women handing out the smocks,just exactly as Mr. Henrie testified
to in his deposition. In sum, Mr. Henrie being ordered by the Church to clean up, as well as to wear

2See

Respondent's Brief, p. 4.
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again ordering him to go to the clean up and also to wear the grotesquely large smock \Vhile he did
the clean up. The District Court's grant of summary judgment under these facts is clearly reversible
error.
B.

AS THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DETERl\lINING
THE CHURCH O\VED NO DUTY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT \VAS NOT
PROPER.

As previously asserted by Mr. Henrie, clearly it was reasonably foreseeable that the Church
owed a duty to Mr. Henrie not to cause him harm, especially when it ordered him to go to the clean
up, and ordered him to wear the grotesquely large smock to participate in the clean up. These facts
establish that a special relationship existed between the Church and Mr. Henrie.
The Church denies it owed any duty or that there was a special relationship. In support of
its position, the Church relies upon two cases, Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 532 (Ct.
App. 2008) and Beers v. Corp. of President of Church, 155 Idaho 680, 316 P.3d 92 (2013).
However, both of those cases are inapposite to this case.
With respect to Boots, the issue the Court of Appeals addressed there was whether a landlord
owed a duty to victims, who were not tenants of the landlord, who were injured by a tenant's dog.

Boots, 145 Idaho at 391, 179 P.3d at 354. Further, in Boots some of the victims were two young
boys that were attacked by a dog after one of the boys provoked the dog. Id, 145 Idaho at 394, 179
P.3d at 357. In that factual context, the Court of Appeals stated "we are aware of no Idaho authority
REPLY BRIEF- Pl"GE3
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addition to the fact that this is not a dog bite case, Boots is inapposite, as the issue there was
whether a landlord was required to protect third persons from a tenant's dog. Clearly there was no
special relationship between the landlord and the victims, who were passerbys, and \Vho had
provoked the tenant's dog.
Contrary to Boots, here

Mr. Henrie is a member of the Church, and the Elders Quorum

President of his \vard, who was ordered to perform an assignment handed down from his stake
president to his bishop to him. The Church also ordered Mr. Henrie to wear the smock or he could
not participate in the clean up.

As the Church controlled Mr. Henrie's conduct, a special

realtionship arose.
Additionally, the Church's reliance upon the holding in Beers, is also misplaced. As the
Church acknowledges, the factual circumstances in Beers are different from the case at issue.

3

Beers involved a minor, whose parents sued the Church for injuries she sustained after she jumped
from a bridge while attending a camp out that was being held among members of the same ward4.
This Court in Beers reasoned that the Beers' claim against the Church was properly dismissed on
summary judgment, after noting the following facts 5 : I) There was no evidence the Church had any

See Respondent's Brief, p. 19.

3

4

Beers, 155 Idaho at 683, 316 P.3d at 95.

5See

Beers, 155 Idaho 687-88, 316 P.3d at 99-100.
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(Henrie Depo. pp. 61:7-63: I 5); 2) No ward member had undertaken supervision of the bridge
jumping activity (not the case with Mr. Henrie, as the clean up was conducted by the
Church/Mormon Helping Hands, and it ordered him to wear the smock to participate-see, R.,

pp. 152 (Henrie Depo., pp. 77:3-79: 19); R., pp. 153-54 (Henrie Depo., pp. 83: 1-84:8; 86:2-7;
87:10-16)); 3) the bridge jumping \Vas not an official ward activity and occurred away from the
camp out location (not the case here, as the clean up was an official Church activity); and 4) the
bridge jumping took place after the conclusion of the last ward planned activity (Mr. Henrie's
injury occurred during the Church's clean up activity-seeR.,p. 169-70 (Henrie Depo.,p. 146:4-

23; 149: 13-150:3)). In summary, Beers is clearly inapposite, as Mr. Henrie was following the
Church's order, engaged in Church activity, and was injured during that activity. 6
Furthermore, the Church takes the position that the District Court correctly identified all of
the appropriate factors to recognize foreseeability of harm, and applied those factors to the facts

The Church also cites to Beers for the proposition that this Court was "unable to ascribe
more blame to the [Church} for this incident." Beers, I 55 Idaho at 687-88, 316 P.3d at 99-100.
The Church also notes this Com1 noted the negative consequences to the community imposing
liability upon religious organizations to members of their faith, noting this would result in a
disincentive to organize fellowship activities. Id. First, again, as previously stated, the facts in
Beers do not match those in the case at hand, as clearly here we have a Church sponsored event,
controlled solely by the Church, who then controlled Mr. Henrie's conduct in forcing him to
perform clean up work at its direction. As a result, the holding in Beers should be limited to the
facts of that case.
6
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of harm to
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,399,987 P.2d 300,311 (l 999)[internal citations
omitted]. It must be remembered, that this Court, in Sharp v. W.H. A1oore Inc., 118 Idaho 297,300,
796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990), explained the concept of duty and foreseeability, as follows:
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure
others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and
to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such injury.
The degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the
danger or hazard connected with the activity. \Vhether the duty attaches
is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the
risk.
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the
circumstances of each case. \Vhere the degree of result or harm is great,
but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability
is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of
foreseeability may be required. Thus, foreseeability is not to be
measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes
whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a
reasonably prudent person would take such into account in guiding
reasonable conduct.

Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 [internal quotations and citations omitted] [bold
emphasis supplied].
The record here shows that the District Court did not consider all the factors. Instead, it
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considered and analyzed the factor of \Vhether the degree of result or harm was great, but preventing

it was not difficult. Had the Court truly addressed that factor, it would have been in Mr. Henrie's
favor. The degree of result of harm here was great, forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the smock while
throwing 2 foot 70 pound logs in an industrial type setting.

Further, that harm was easily

preventable, i.e. the Church not forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the grotesquely large smock.
In addition, nowhere did the District Court indicate in its decision that it considered the
factor as to whether the threatened injury was minor but the burden of preventing the injury was
high. Again, had the District Court considered this factor it would have gone in Mr. Henrie's favor,
as the threatened injury was not minor. While the Church tries to downplay it, Mr. Henrie suffered

7The

Church inaccurately quotes Mr. Henrie's statements in his initial brief related to the
District Court placing sole emphasis on whether imposing a duty would kill the Mormon
Helping Hands. The Church's misquote, with its errors in bold, is as follows:
Henrie argues that "It beggars belief that the Church's liability to Mr. Henrie for
damages [no comma] would "kill" any future efforts by the Church, since it is
well known that the church is an (sic) multibillion dollar religious/charitable
organization."

Respondent's Brief at p. 15. The actual passage from Mr. Henrie's brief, at page 33, with the
differences from the Church's quote in bold, was as follows:

It beggars belief that the Church's liability to Mr. Henrie for damages, would
"kill" any future efforts by the Church, since it is well-known that the Church is a
multi-billion dollar religious/charitable organization.
R.EPLY BRIEF- PAGE
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Furthermore, the record does not show that the District Court considered the closeness of the
connection between the Church's conduct and the injuries suffered, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the Church or the availability, cost and prevalence for the risk
involved.
The only concern for the District Court was the effect on the Church. In is response, the
Church did not dispute Mr. Henrie's argument, that the District Court improperly sided with the
Church by declining to impose a duty on the Church as a charitable entity. The District Court's
decision violates this Court's holding in Steed v. Grand Teton Counsel ofthe Boy Scouts ofAmerica,
Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007). There, this Court rejected arguments that it should

immunize charitable organizations from liability in tort for public policy reasons. Steed, 144 Idaho
at 856, 172 P.3d at 1131. In sum, the language in Steed, as well as this Court limiting the holding
in Beers to the facts presented in that case establish the District Court improperly granted summary
judgment to the Church.
C.

THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT MR. HENRIE HAD A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP \VITH THE CHURCH THEREBY CREATING A DUTY
THE CHURCH O\VED TO MR. HENRIE.

The Church misread Mr. Henrie's Opening Brief, when it asserted that "nowhere in his brief
does Henrie analyze or even discuss the relevant rules and factors for determining the existence of
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and Rees v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006). A special
relationship can arise where a party against whom the duty has been asserted, has exercised some
right to control the injured party's conduct. Twpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. Again, as
Mr. Henrie argued in his Opening Brief, and has argued here, the Church certainly had the right to
control Mr. Henrie's conduct, such that a special relationship existed between it and him. It is not
disputed that Mr. Henrie was a member of the Church, and the Elders Quorum President of his ward.
While it is factually disputed by the Church, Mr. Henrie's testimony was that he was given an
external order by the Church through his Stake President and his Bishop to go to the clean up. The
Church also ordered Mr. Henrie to wear the smock or he could not paiiicipate. The record is replete
with facts establishing that the Church had the right, and did impose control over Mr. Henrie's
conduct.
For the Church to assert that Mr. Henrie was not in the custody of the Church at the time of
the accident, and that they were not controlling his conduct in throwing logs down the hill, misses
the point. Mr. Henrie was certainly in the Church's custody, as the Church was the only entity that
organized the clean up, was the only entity that was handing out the smocks and had ordered Mr.
Henrie to go to that clean up by handing down the assignment from stake president, to bishop, to

See Respondent's Brief, p. 18.

8
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a
Church and Mr. Henrie, thereby establishing a duty that the Church O\ved to Mr. Henrie. The
Church breached its duty, which is an issue of fact for a jury, not the District Court, to decide.

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY RULED ON THE ISSUE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Church cites to Lambertv. Hasson, 121 Idaho 133,823 P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1991) where
the Court of Appeals held "proximate cause is generally an issue for the jury unless the proof is so
clear that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would
construe the facts and circumstances one ,vay." 9 Lambert supports Mr. Henrie's position, as the
facts in this case establish that an issue of fact exists as to proximate cause.
The Church claims that the record does not reflect the Church exercised any control over
Henrie as to it being obligatory for him to be involved in the clean up and being forced to wear the
smock. Once again, the record belies the Church's position. As to being ordered to go to the clean
up, as has been previously stated and reiterated by Mr. Henrie, the stake president gave the
assignment, which were Mr. Henrie's bishop's words, and that Mr. Henrie took that as an
assignment, again, according to Mr. Henrie's bishop. R., pp. 212-13. Mr. Henrie certainly took it
as an external order, given solely to him, and, being raised in the LOS faith, noted, that when a
bishop tells him to do something, he does it, because he feels as ifhe is doing the work of the Lord.

9

Lambert, 121 Idaho at 137,823 P.2d at 171.
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150 (Henrie Depa., p. 69:5-12). This corresponds with the Church's policy for its members to
respond to its needs. R., p. 203. Further, Mr. Henrie was also ordered to wear the smock or the
Church would not allow him to participate. R., p. 154 (Henrie Depa., p. 86:2-22). The record
ce1iainly raises an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Henrie was ordered to clean up and \Vear the
smock by the Church. Mr. Henrie felt, as a lifelong LOS member, and the Elders Quorum President
of his ward, that he had an external order from the Church to go to the clean up and had no choice
in the matter. That is an issue of fact for the jury to decide, not the District Court on summary
judgment.

E.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN EXCLUDING MR.
HENRIE'S TESTIMONY THAT THE CHURCH'S AGENT TOLD HIM HE
\VAS REQUIRED TO \VEAR THE SMOCK OR HE COULD NOT
PARTICIPATE IN THE CLEAN UP.

The Church did not refute Mr. Henrie's citation to State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,421,224
P.3d 485,488 (2009).

10

To reiterate this Court's rule from that case, a trial court's discretion does

not entitle it to alter or disregard specific standards or ignore that it is bound by rules of law.

The Church mistakenly claims that Mr. Henrie conflated the summary judgment
standard with that for the admission of evidence. As the Court can see, at pages 21 through 23 of
his initial brief, Mr. Henrie recited the standard related to the Court's exclusion of the admission
of a party opponent, and, in those passages, Mr. Henrie not only identified the standard, but that
the District Court failed to properly follow that standard.
10
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at 487-88. Further, the Church also did not dispute that a trial court's discretion is only broad where
it is the fact finder and bounded by the rules and principles of law. Id., 148 Idaho at 421, 224 P.3d
at 488. This Court in Watkins held that the district court in that case abused its discretion, when
it incorrectly rule on an issue related to hearsay. Id., 148 Idaho at 423-427, 224 P.3d at 490-494.
Likewise, in this case, the District Court erred in applying the hearsay rule pursuant to IRE
801 (d)(2)(D). I I
The colloquy between Mr. Henrie and the Church's agent at the tables, that Mr. Henrie had
to wear the smock or could not participate is not hearsay. The Church put their agents at those
tables, with the authority to prevent Mr. Henrie from working unless he wore the smock. The
Church's agent's statement, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 80l(d)(2)(D) is an admission by
the Church and therefore not hearsay, as it is corroborated by the Mormon Helping Hands video. 12
II

Mr. Henrie also notes that the Church did not oppose or refute Mr. Henrie's argument
that by granting summary judgment to the Church, the District Court denied him his
constitutional right to a jury trial. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p.23.

The Church cites to R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 142 Idaho 87, 123 P.3d 720 (Ct. App.
2005), where the Court of Appeals held there needs to be independent evidence of an agency to
corroborate the declarations of an alleged agent. R Homes Corp., 142 Idaho at 93, 123 P.3d at
725. The Court should look at R Homes for that Jaw, but find that it is factually inapposite to the
case at hand. Again, what the Church does not and cannot refute is the fact that it was the only
entity that had set up the clean up effort in every respect.
12
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V.

10,

1

278 (1972) and Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1995). The Church has not
disputed that it has long been settled that apparent authority exists "when a principal voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business
usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in be! ieving that the agent is acting
pursuant to existing authority." Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 278, 280 (1972);

Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing, Clark, supra). Apparent
authority is sufficient to bind a principal to a contract entered into by an agent with a third party, as
long as the agent acted within the course and scope of authority delegated by the principal. Clark,

supra. 95 Idaho, at 11-12, 501 P.2d at 279-80; Bailey, supra, 109 Idaho at 498, 708 P.2d at 903. In
addition, the issue of apparent authority is a question for the jury to decide. Clark, 95 Idaho at 12,

13

Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-36. The Church also cited to US. v. Portsmouth Paving

Co,p., 694 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. Ct App. 1983), which is supportive of Mr. Henrie's position. In
Portsmouth Paving, the Fourth Circuit held that an agency relationship existed between the
alleged agent, thereby attributing the agent's declaration against the adverse party. In

Portsmouth, Portsmouth Paving Corporation's president was indicted for conspiracy to allocate
contracts and to rig bids in violation of the Sherman Act. Id., 694 F.2d at 315. One of the US
Government's witnesses testified as to Portsmouth Paving Corporation's president's
involvement in the antitrust conduct, and at one point he had called the president's office and
spoken with a secretary, which Portsmouth objected to as inadmissible hearsay. Id., at 321.
However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it was not hearsay, finding that there was sufficient
independent evidence to establish the existence of the agency relationship and hold the agent's
statement attributed to the president of Portsmouth Paving as an admission of a party opponent.
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evidence are admissible." Clark, supra, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280 (citations
omitted)( emphasis supplied)).
Here, the record shows the Church's agents were handing out the smocks. The Church was
the only entity that had organized the clean up effort. The Church placed its agents at the tables
handing out smocks. The Mormon Helping Hands video establishes and corroborates this. Thus,
it was clear error for the District Court to conclude that there was no corroborative evidence
whatsoever. The District Court's decision excluding that evidence is the type of erroneous action
this Court found improper in State v. Watkins, supra., 148 Idaho at 423-27, 224 P .3d at 490-94.
Thus, this Court must reverse and remand.
F.

MR. HENRIE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.

Mr. Henrie is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho
Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Mr. Henrie submits that as the District Court erred in granting to
summary judgment, his appeal is not frivoulous, but reasonable and with proper foundation. For
these reasons, Mr. Henrie is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Henrie respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District
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